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Economic growth in Latin America has proved to be elusive in the last twenty five years. 
After the “lost decade” in the 1980’s there were hopes that there would be an acceleration 
of growth after 1990. After all, in practically all economies of the region there was a 
significant move towards the implementation of structural reforms such as opening up 
national markets to imports, privatization of public-owned assets, and overhaul of social 
security systems. But this significant improvement in growth performance simply did not 
happen. Between 1990 and 2003 GDP-PPP per capita in Latin America and the 
Caribbean increased only 1% yearly compared to the 1.5% world average and similar 
rates in the mature OECD economies
2. In East Asia and the Pacific GDP-PPP per capita 
increased 6.3% yearly in the same period, in spite of the bad Japanese growth 
performance. Even if, to avoid the impact of the Argentinean debacle, focus is centered 
on the 1990-2001 period, the picture is not changed significantly as Latin America and 
the Caribbean still grew less in per capita PPP terms than the world and the developed 
economies. Only in a small number of Latin American and Caribbean economies the rate 
of growth of GDP-PPP per capita exceeded 2% yearly in 1990-2001: notably in Chile 
(4.4%) and Argentina (2.5%) among the larger economies, and in eight smaller Central 
American and Caribbean economies of which the largest were Costa Rica, the Dominican 
Republic and El Salvador (see table 1).   
  
Given this mediocre regional growth performance, especially if compared with most 
Asian economies, it is only natural that there was a backlash concerning the views on the  
nature of policies that might contribute to assure that Latin America and the Caribbean 
enter an era of steady high growth. Some – with a rather selective memory – in fact argue 
that the mediocre performance resulted from the market-friendly reforms of the very late 
1980s and 1990s. Others argue that it was the lack of sufficiently deep market-friendly 
reforms or their defective or incomplete implementation that answered for the lack of 
growth. In any case the idea that such reforms, even if well implemented, might have 
been insufficient to change the Latin American and Caribbean appalling recent growth 
record started to become widespread.  
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Table 1 
Latin America: GDP-PPP per capita, GDP-PPP per capita yearly growth, total 
GDP-PPP, population and population density by economy, 2001 and 1990-2001 
 GDP-PPP  GDP-PPP  Population  Total 
  per capita  per capita  millions  GDP-PPP 
  yearly   1995 constant    1995 constant 
  growth  US dollars    US dollars 
  1990-2001      billion    
Antigua and Barbuda  0.8 8542 0.1 1
Argentina 2.5 10715 36.5 391
Bahamas -0.4 14947 0.3 5
Barbados 1.1 13812 0.3 4
Belize 2.7 5435 0.2 1
Bolivia 0.8 2167 8.6 19
Brazil 1.3 6840 172.4 1179
Chile 4.4 8575 15.4 132
Colombia 0.3 5733 43.0 247
Costa Rica  2.6 7850 3.9 30
Dominica 1.8 5047 0.1 0
Dominican Republic  3.9 5714 8.5 48
Ecuador -0.4 3097 12.6 39
El Salvador  2.4 4308 6.3 27
Grenada 2.1 6144 0.1 1
Guatemala 1.1 3581 11.7 42
Guyana 1.7 3840 0.8 3
Haiti -3.4 1477 8.1 12
Honduras 0.0 2304 6.6 15
Jamaica -0.3 3451 2.6 9
Mexico 1.4 8032 99.4 798
Nicaragua 1.7 2307 5.2 12
Panama 2.8 5659 2.9 16
Paraguay -0.1 4354 5.4 23
Peru 1.7 4274 26.3 113
St. Kitts and Nevis  4.0 10517 0.0 0
St. Lucia  0.1 4736 0.2 1
St. Vinc. & Grenadines  2.8 5769 0.1 1
Suriname n.a. 2500 0.4 1
Trinidad and Tobago  2.3 8237 1.3 11
Uruguay 1.6 7861 3.3 26
Venezuela -0.2 5253 24.6 129
Source: World Bank.  
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In many quarters, including influential sectors of the traditional academic establishment 
in developed economies, started to gain ground the idea that, after all, at least some of the 
old “industrial policies” – or perhaps other innovative ad hoc growth-promoting policies 
– could still have an important role to play in stimulating sustained growth in LAC 
economies. This “on second thoughts” literature is of course legitimate in its questioning 
of the limitations of orthodox recipes. But it has also had a less than fortunate influence 
on recent policy-making in many developing economies through their local 
reverberations especially in the local media and among populist polticians. They provide 
high-grade ammunition to those who favor a return to old pick-the-loser “industrial 
policies”. These were simply based on continuous subsidization of inefficient producers 
never able to become competitive in the international markets in a process which had 
nothing to do with divergences between social and private costs and benefits.  
 
This paper’s main concern is to assess which “industrial policies” would be meaningful 
for Latin America nowadays. The first section considers definitions of “industrial 
policies” and their nature in the past. It analyses policies that are designed to correct  
market failures and how new proposals have widened the traditional understanding of the 
scope of these “second best” policies. The second section centers on national growth 
experiences that may serve as paradigms for LAC economies. It considers growth in a 
long-term perspective but focuses first on the post-1960 and then on the post-1990 
periods in an effort of identification of paradigmatic experiences based on the actual 
growth performance of different economies. Section 3 is on economies which are growth 
paradigms and on their relevant policies. It analyses which specific policies were adopted 
by economies particularly successful in terms of growth performance and to what extent 
other factors may have explained growth. It includes an effort to compare, population- 
and GDP-wise, the size of economies in LAC and those of economies which may serve 
as growth paradigms.  
 
Section 4 is on present multilateral constraints on “industrial policies”, especially in the 
case of subsidies and trade-related investment measures, as these have been considerably 
tightened as a result of the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations.  The   6
following section analyses the link between macroeconomics and “industrial policies” 
both in relation to limitations imposed by macroeconomic instability on industrial policy 
and to how growth depends on the cost of investment on both micro and macroeconomic 
factors. Section 6 analyses industrial policy alternatives. The paper  concludes with 
section 7 which is on policy recommendations seeking to improve criteria to pick winners 
where market failures are especially costly.  
 
 
1. Industrial policies  
 
The first problem with the term “industrial policy” is that it excludes agriculture and 
services from “government efforts to alter the [economic] structure to promote 
productivity-based growth”.
3 The bias in favor of industrially-induced growth is obvious 
and does not even seem reasonable in the light of historical evidence. It would be perhaps 
preferable to use “microeconomic policies” as opposed to macroeconomic and 
institutional policies. From this point onwards in this paper, unless explicitly stated 
otherwise, by “industrial policies” are meant microeconomic policies.    
 
Which were the industrial policies adopted in the past? They were mostly of a vertical 
nature, that is, based on a selection of targets. In certain economies, as Brazil, commodity 
prices were sustained by massive stockpiling since the beginning of the last century. The 
implications for Brazil, and also for free riders elsewhere in Central and South America, 
were of enormous significance. For non-agricultural goods until the great depression of 
1928-1933, the most important vertical policy was related to the very high import tariff. 
Then a major role was played by import licensing as governments maintained a relatively 
overvalued exchange rate and needed an additional instrument to ration imports. This 
restriction was sanctioned by the rather lax application by the GATT of waivers in 
situations of balance of payments difficulties (article XVIII:b). As import substitution 
industrialization deepened a vast array of instruments was added to the arsenal of 
industrial policies. Without any hope of exhausting the long list, mention can be made to: 
                                                       
3 This is a minor adjustment of the definition of industrial policies suggested by the influential World Bank 
(1993).   7
selective access to credit, often heavily subsidized; requirements related to national 
content; stimuli to foreign direct investment, including favorable fiscal treatment, access 
to foreign exchange at favorable exchange rates and limitations to right of establishment 
for competitors; export subsidies.  
 
But old policies, often of continuous subsidization, faced not only increasingly tight 
multilateral legal constraints, but in many cases also increasing domestic political 
resistance from those adversely affected by them. They have tended to be superseded by 
policies better justified on economic arguments, based on the correction of market 
failures which result in divergence between private and social costs and benefits. The 
nature of the externalities targeted by such policies can vary considerably. Policies which 
address the problems raised by externalities generated by the appropriation of results and 
risk related to scientific and technological research or to specialization of manpower have 
long been recognized and are uncontroversial. Policies targeting the reduction of regional 
disparities may be similarly rationalized: market failures are often more intense in poorer 
regions.   
 
Policies designed to cope with coordinating failures including upstream and downstream 
investments are perhaps more controversial. The rationale for a focus on the clustering of 
investments is not unrelated to arguments in favor of public investments in infrastructure. 
The new angle is that the targeted infrastructure is often much more specialized than 
conventional investment in infrastructure of universal use such as roads.
4   
 
2. The search of paradigms 
  
Dissatisfaction with the performance of Latin American economies has prompted a quest 
for successful national experiences elsewhere from which lessons could be hopefully 
extracted. There is, however, room for dissatisfaction with most of this pick and choose 
literature which fails to take into account national specificities which are at the root of the 
histories of success in achieving high and sustained growth.  
                                                       
4  See Rodrik (2004) and also Corden (1974), pp. 248-264.   8
  
High growth is not a new experience in the world economy. What is new is that after 
World War II so many economies have been able to sustain high growth, often 
continuously, in many regions: in the economies which have been called of recent 
settlement, in Western Europe, and particularly in Asia. In Asia, extremely high rates of 
growth in fact became commonplace. Before 1870 GDP-PPP per capita yearly growth 
rates were rarely above 1% in Europe. In Asia they were in the 0.1– 0.2% range. It was in 
parts of the periphery of the world economy, especially in Australia and New Zealand, 
and also to a less extent in the US and Canada, mainly in 1820-1850, that   higher rates of 
growth were achieved (see Table 2).
 5 
 
Between 1870 and 1913 rates of growth in Europe accelerated, typically exceeding 1% 
per capita, and approached 2% in selected cases as Switzerland in 1870-1900 and 
Norway and Italy in 1900-1913.  Almost all the so-called western offshoots, but 
especially Canada and the United States, grew very rapidly. In Asia, only in Japan and in 
certain small British colonies – Hong Kong, Singapore – there was growth in the 1-2% 
yearly per capita range. In Latin America pre-1900 data are scarce but growth after 1870 
was substantial in Argentina and Mexico (around 2.5% yearly). In 1900-1913 there was 
relatively high growth in all the region as growth accelerated in the world economy as a 
whole: above 2% in Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela and above 1.4% elsewhere.     
 
From 1913 to 1928 growth in Europe was slower than in the golden age earlier in the 
century, but still generally above 1% per capita yearly with the exception of the defeated 
nations in the First World War – Austria, Germany and Turkey – and the United 
Kingdom and Ireland. GDP-PPP per capita in Greece and Switzerland increased more 
than 2% yearly. Canada and the United States grew above 1%,  but the performance of 
Australia and New Zealand worsened considerably. For the first time since 1820 several 
economies in Asia grew at more than 2% – Japan and Malaysia – and some of them at 
more than 3%, as the Philippines and Taiwan. In Latin America, the Venezuelan growth 
                                                       
5 There is long-term information comparable to that on other regions only for a limited group of Latin 
American economies.     9
performance was outstanding – almost 8% yearly on a PPP per capita basis – and above 
2% in Brazil and Peru. In Mexico, growth was below 1% in the midst of troubled times 
but in other economies it was in the 1–2% range. 
 
Between 1928 and 1945 in very few European economies GDP-PPP per capita increased 
by more than 1% yearly: most of the neutral countries, the United Kingdom, Norway and 
Finland. Switzerland was the star performer with a rate of 2.5% (for 1945-2001 data,  see 
Table 3). In many European economies and in most of Asia it fell substantially. Among 
the western offshoots, the United States performance was spectacular, depression and all, 
with GDP-PPP per capita growing 3.5% yearly. Canada and New Zealand approached 
2% while Australia remained somewhat behind. In Latin America only in Venezuela 
GDP-PPP grew above 2% yearly. In most of the other big economies it increased around 
1%, but in Argentina and Uruguay, as well as in Costa Rica, it stagnated or even fell 
slightly.  
 
Between 1945 and 1960 the high growth rates in Europe partly reflected the fact that in 
1945 the levels of GDP-PPP per capita in many economies were still below their peak in 
the late 1920s or early 1930s. In Belgium, France, Germany, Italy and the Netherlands 
this was recovered only in the late 1940s or even early 1950s. In Spain only in 1955. The 
United Kingdom was an exception as GDP-PPP per capita had not decreased during the 
war. Its much lower post-war growth rate was partly a reflection of this fact. Recovery 
was slower in Asia, with the exception of Japan, as the pre-1930 peak was only reached 
in the early 1960s in many economies.  
 
Growth between 1945 and 1960 in the western offshoots was much slower than in Europe 
– and even negative in the US – given their much better performance in 1928-1945. In 
1945-1960, the Latin American economies were already comfortably above their pre-
depression peak levels and there  was substantial growth in Venezuela, Brazil and Costa 
Rica – above 3% – and reasonable growth of 1–2% elsewhere.  
 




Selected economies: GDP-PPP per capita, average yearly growth rates, 1820-1850 to 
1928-1945, and population, 1945*  
  Population  GDP-PPP per capita, average yearly growth rates 
  million           
  1945  1820-18501850-18701870-19001900-1913 1913-1928 1928-1945
Europe          
  Austria  6.8 1.0 0.4 1.3 1.4 0.4  -4.3
  Belgium  8.3 1.1 0.7 1.1 0.9 1.3  -1.0
  Denmark  4.0 1.1 0.2 1.4 1.8 1.5 0.3
  Finland  3.8 0.5 0.4 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.4
  France  39.7 1.1 0.3 1.4 1.5 1.6  -3.1
  Germany  67.0 0.9 0.5 1.6 1.6 0.8 0.6
 Greece  7.3  0.8 0.2 1.4 1.3  2.3  -5.0
  Ireland  3.0 n.a 0.6 1.0 1.2 0.0 0.6
 Italy  45.4  0.6 0.2 0.6 2.8  1.1 -2.6
 Netherlands  9.3  0.9 0.3 0.7 1.3  2.3  -4.3
 Norway  3.1  0.2 0.4 1.0 2.0  1.6 1.4
  Portugal  8.0 0.0 0.1 1.0 -0.3 1.1 1.2
  Spain  26.8 0.2 0.2 1.3 1.1 1.5  -1.2
  Sweden  6.6 0.2 0.5 1.5 1.5 1.1 2.5
 Switzerland  4.4  1.0 0.7 2.0 0.8  2.5  1.4
  Turkey  18.8 0.5 0.2 0.9 0.9  -0.9 0.5
  UK  49.2 1.0 0.6 1.1 0.7 0.6 1.6
     
Western 
offshoots      
 Australia  7.4  4.6 1.0 0.7 1.9 0.4 1.4
 Canada   12.4  1.3 0.5 1.8 3.3  1.0 1.9
 New Zealand  1.7  3.6 2.0 1.1 1.4 0.0 1.8
 US  140.5  1.2 0.6 1.7 2.0  1.4  3.5
            
Asia             
 China   532.6  0.0 -0.2 0.1 0.0  0.1  -1.1
  Hong  Kong  1.5 0.2 0.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
 Índia  410.4  n.a. 0.0 0.4 0.9  0.3  -0.4
 Indonésia  73.3  n.a. 0.1 0.4 1.5  1.6  -1.7
 Japan  76.2  n.a. 0.1 1.6 1.3  2.4  -2.3
 Korea, Rep.  17.9  n.a. 0.0 0.7 0.7  1.6  -3.1
 Malaysia  5.7  n.a. 0.1 0.7 0.7  2.9  -1.4  11
 Phillippines  18.2  0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1  4.0  -3.4
  Singapore    0.9 0.2 0.1 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
 Taiwan  6.5  0.2 0.1 0.7 0.7  3.3  -2.8
 Thailand  17.3  n.a. 0.1 0.4 0.4  -0.4  0.1
         
Latin 
America         
 Argentina  15.4  n.a. n.a. 2.5 1.4 1.8 0.1
 Brasil  46.2  0.2 0.1 -0.2 1.4  2.4  1.1
 Chile  5.6  n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.4  1.1 0.9
  Colombia  10.5 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.9 1.3 1.4
 Costa Rica  0.7  n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.  n.a.  -0.3
 México  23.7  n.a. -0.1 2.4 1.8 0.5 0.8
 Peru  6.9  n.a  n.a. n.a. 1.9  2.4  1.8
 Uruguay  2.1  n.a. n.a. 0.1 3.1  1.1 -0.2
 Venezuela   4.2  n.a. n.a. n.a. 2.3 7.8 2.4
Source: Data from Maddison (2002). 
* Growth rates of 2% and above in bold. N.a. means not available. 
 
 
After 1960 it became clear that the world economy had entered a period of substantially 
higher growth than in any previous period. In contrast with the good performance 
concentrated on the western offshoots and a few economies in Northern Europe, and in 
Latin America in specific periods, now growth affected many parts of the world economy 
in a rather more sustained fashion. Growth in the western offshoots was generally at rates 
around 2%, but sometimes exceeded 3% yearly and with a sustained outstanding 
performance of the United States economy.  
 
Western Europe’s GDP-PPP per capita grew at more than 3% or 4%  – especially until 
1980 – with particularly good performances by Italy, the Iberian economies and Greece. 
After 1980, rates of growth decreased almost everywhere in Europe to under 2% with the 
exception of Austria, Finland, Ireland, oil-rich Norway, Portugal and Spain. The 
spectacular history of success in 1990s is Ireland where GDP-PPP per capita increased 
6.3% yearly. Turkey’s 1945-1990 performance was also rather good even if less 
mentioned. 
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After 1960, GDP-PPP per capita levels in almost Asia grew at much higher rates than 
elsewhere. Growth of GDP-PPP per capita was particularly fast in Japan in the 1960s – 
9.2% yearly – falling to more than 3% in the 1970s and 1980s.  In Hong Kong, Korea, 
Singapore and Taiwan it grew at 5– 8% yearly between 1960 and 1990, then fell to the 3– 
5% range in the 1990s with the exception of Hong Kong where it fell rather more. 
Malaysia and Thailand’s performance was generally 1-2% points below this performance 
in 1960-1990 and similarly in the 1990s. China’s yearly rate of growth of GDP-PPP per 
capita increased from 3.1% in the 1970s to 6.6% in the 1990s. India grew very little until 
1980 then – ceasing to be a clear outlier in Asia – at rather more than 3% yearly. In Asia 
even in the 1990s only in Japan and the Philippines GDP-PPP per capita increased less 
than 1%.  
 
The contrast with Latin America is sharp. In the 1960s almost all Latin American 
economies increased their GDP-PPP per capita at rates in the 2-3% range in contrast with 
the 3–9% range in Asia. Only the big backward economies – China, India and Indonesia 
– were laggard with rates in the 1–2% range. In the 1970s Brazil approached the standard 
Asian performance with GDP-PPP per capita increasing 5.5% yearly and several other 
Latin American economies had creditable performances in the 2.4–3.8% range but others 
as Argentina, Chile, Peru and Venezuela much less so. The 1980s were a disastrous 
decade for Latin America with negative per capita PPP growth in most economies while 
in the 1990s the only cases where growth per capita exceeded 2% were Argentina, Chile 
and Costa Rica. Given the macroeconomic distortions which accompanied the 
Argentinean growth spurt it is to be doubted whether this specific case can be taken as 
exemplary. One of the more attractive features of the Chilean success history after the 
mid-1980s is that a very good growth record was accompanied by rather virtuous 
macroeconomic policies with stress on fiscal disciplines and avoidance of exchange rate 
misalignments. This was in sharp contrast with some of the previous success histories in 
Latin America.     
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3. Economic growth paradigms and their policies  
 
Based on the evidence presented in section 2 it is clear that most examples of recent 
sustained high growth are in Asia, with China including Hong Kong occupying a 
prominent place. The news is that India has been performing extremely well in the last 
twenty years so that it is another experience to be taken into account. In Europe there is 
the well known case of Ireland whose GDP-PPP per capita increased 6.2% yearly in 
1990-2001. Finland is another case of success although its pace of growth fell in the 
1990s. Perhaps it is the central role of high technology firms that explains why the 
experience is so often quoted. While yearly rates of growth have been recently declining 
in Portugal and Spain their performance since 1960 has been excellent. Since 1960, 
Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain have expanded their GDP-PPP per capita 4–5 times 
compared to 6–13 times in the more successful Asian economies. Other more mature 
economies – European and offshoots – have typically increased it 2-3 times. In Latin 
America, Brazil, the most successful economy in 1960-2001, multiplied its GDP-PPP per 
capita 2.4 times compared to 2.6 in India, the least successful of the Asian economies for 
which there is information in the long-term. Finally, there is the case of Chile as a 
paradigm based on its very good performance in the 1990s.  
 
The quest for paradigms of growth experiences must take into account many specificities 
both of economies selected as examples of fast growth and those which are seeking 
lessons which can serve to formulate more successful policies. Among those more 
relevant perhaps are: size of population and area, location in relation to major markets, 
conditions of access to those markets (FTAs), “cultural” factors (language, size of 
diaspora), factor endowments, savings ratio, among others. Table 4 presents a taxonomy 
of paradigm economies and of follower economies seeking growth lessons based on size. 
 
It can always be argued that China and India are in a league of their own as their size has 
no counterpart in LAC. But the discussion of problems faced by Brazil and Mexico, the 
two big LAC economies, both with a rather mediocre growth history in the last 25 years, 
may gain something from the success experiences of China, and perhaps even more, of 
India. The political economy of clustering in economies with big populations and areas is    14
 
Table 3 
Selected economies: GDP-PPP per capita, average yearly growth rates, 1945-1960 











GDP-PPP per capita, average yearly growth rates 
       1945-1960 1960-1970 1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2001
   
Europe  
 Austria  8.2 1939 9.3 4.1 3.5 2.1 1.6
 Belgium  10.3 1939, 1949 3.2 4.3 3.1  1.7 1.8
 Denmark  5.4 1946 3.8 3.7 1.8 1.9 2.1
 Finland  5.2 1934 4.0 4.4 3.1 2.7 1.7
 France  59.7 1939, 1949 7.4 4.5 2.6  1.8 1.4
 Germany  82.3 1935, 1951 3.6 3.5 2.7  1.2 1.5
 Greece  10.6 1931, 1940 8.4 7.0 3.7  1.1 2.1
 Ireland  3.9 1936** 2.4 3.8 3.3 3.3 6.3
 Italy  57.8 1935, 1948 7.8 5.1 3.1 2.2 1.4
 Netherlands  16.0 1949 7.8 3.7 2.1  1.6 2.1
 Norway  4.5 1934, 1945*** 4.0 3.4 4.2 2.0 2.6
 Spain  40.1 1955 2.6 7.5 3.8 2.7 2.4
 Sweden  8.9 1934*** 3.0 3.9 1.6 1.7 1.4
 Switzerland  7.3 1938, 1945 3.2 3.1 1.1 1.4 0.3
 Portugal  10.2 1933, 1941@ 3.3 6.4 3.9 3.0 2.5
 Turkey  66.5 1933, 1946** 4.5 3.2 2.7 3.1 1.2
 UK  59.7 1934 1.4 2.2 1.8  2.4 1.9
             
Western 
offshoots   
 
       
 Australia  19.4 1937@@ 1.6 3.2 1.8 1.7 2.3
 Canada   31.6 1937 1.4 3.2 3.0  1.6 1.5
 New Zealand  3.9 1936 2.3 1.4 1.0 1.2 1.3
 US  285.0 1940 -0.2 2.9 2.0 2.2 1.7
             
Asia             
 China   1275.4 1954 2.5 1.5 3.1 5.7 6.2
 Hong Kong  7.2 n.a. 2.8 6.2 6.3 5.3 1.8
 India  1023.6 1960 0.8 1.4 0.8  3.4 3.7
 Indonesia  214.3 1938, 1970 1.2 1.6 4.6 3.0 2.4
 Japan  126.9 1933, 1951 7.5 9.3 3.3 3.4 0.9  15
 Malaysia  47.6 1964 2.2 3.1 5.8 3.4 3.8
 Phillippines  22.2 1932, 1961 4.0 1.8 3.0  -0.7 0.7
 Singapore   81.4 n.a. 1.1 6.2 7.4 5.0 3.2
 South Korea  4.3 1933, 1957@ 4.0 5.9 7.7 7.8 4.9
 Taiwan  22.3 1935, 1955 4.8 7.2 7.0 5.4 4.6
 Thailand  63.0 n.a. 1.9 4.6 4.2 6.1 3.0
Latin 
America   
 
       
 Argentina  37.9 1944 1.6 2.8 1.2 -2.4 2.2
 Brasil  177.8 1936 3.5 2.7 5.5  -0.5 1.1
 Chile  15.3 1943 1.2 2.1 0.8 1.1 4.1
 Colombia  40.3 1933 1.8 2.2 3.3  1.3 0.5
 Costa Rica  3.8 1937@@ 3.5 3.3 2.7  -0.3 2.3
 Peru  101.9 1934 2.8 2.3 1.0 -3.5 1.9
 Mexico  27.5 1939 2.6 3.2 3.8  -0.3 1.3
 Uruguay  3.4 1946*** 1.9 0.4 2.4  -0.2 1.4
 Venezuela   23.9 1936*** 4.3 1.0 -0.5 -2.0 0.2
Source: Data from Maddison (2002). 
* Growth rates of 2% and above in bold. N.a. means not available. 
** Peak in 1926. *** Peak in 1930. 
@ Peak in 1927. @@Peak in 1931. 
 
 
likely to be more complex than that in very small economies where the national 
consequences of a single investment decision are bound to be much more important. The 
interplay between industrial and regional policies is likely to be more significant. The 
discussion of specific national experiences of high growth and related industrial policies 
should be read with  these considerations on size in mind although it is perfectly possible 
that a policy instrument which has been successfully used in a small economy may be 




There are a few stylized facts which are common to the successful Asian economies. 
Gross fixed capital formation was often quite high or at least has risen from the 1960’s to 
the 1980’s. In the 1960’s only in China and Korea GFKF was above 20% of GDP 
(decadal average). By the  1970’s and 1980’s it exceeded 40% in Singapore and 30-35% 
in China. It was in the 25-27% range in 1970’s in Korea, Hong Kong and Thailand and   16
22-23% in  Indonesia and Malaysia. In all these latter economies it was in the 28-30% 
range in the 1980’s. India was the laggard economy from the point of view of GFKF but 
even there the average rose from 18.7% in 1970’s to 22% in the 1980’s.  In 1990-2003 it 
remained high in China (39%), around 29% in most other economies – Korea, Malaysia, 
Thailand, Singapore and  Hong Kong  – and lower in India and Indonesia (23.1%)  and 
Indonesia (21.9%). But in many economies there was a marked fall in these levels after 
the end of 1990s: the low 20%s in Thailand, Singapore, Malaysia and Hong Kong and 
17% in Indonesia. In contrast, GFKF in LAC in the early 2000’s is not markedly above 
its level in the early 1960’s, hovering around 21% after peaking in the mid-1970’s at 26% 
and falling to 17% in midst of the crisis in the mid-1980’s. Growth in the Asian high-
performing economies has also relied on high rates of total factor productivity growth 
which in turn depended, pure convergence apart, on openness and/or the weight of 
manufactured exports in total exports.
6   
 
Table 4 
Population of growth paradigms and followers, 2003, in millions 
Followers   Paradigms 
Very large:    Very large:   
 Brazil  177      China  1288 
 Mexico  102      India  1064 
Large: Large:   
 Colombia  44  Korea  48 
 Argentina  38  Spain   41 
   Thailand  62 
Middle sized:   
 Ecuador, Guatemala, 
 Venezuela, Peru  10-26
Middle sized: 






 Bolivia, Dominican   
 Republic, Haiti, Honduras,  
 Jamaica, Trinidad and  
 Tobago and  Uruguay  3-10
Small: 









Very small:  
 Eleven Caribbean islands  Less than 1
  
Source: World Bank Indicators. 
 
                                                       
6 World Bank (1993).   17
All these economies have substantially expanded their export to GDP ratios since the 
1960’s. Even latecomer economies such as Vietnam have already reached an export to 
GDP ratio of 56%. But it is only in Hong Kong and Singapore that the export to GDP 
ratio reached extremely high values (141% and 116%, respectively). The average in Latin 
America is 21% in contrast with only 9% in 1970. Many Asian economies have 
multiplied their share in world exports by a factor of 3 or 4 since 1970, as much as some 
of the extremely successful European economies, but Korea, the Asian success history, 
multiplied it by 8. On average LAC’s shares of world exports decreased from 6% in 1960 
to reach less than 4% in the 1990’s. In 2002 it was 5%. FDI to GDP ratios have been very 
high – in the 10% range – only in Hong Kong and Singapore, and to a lesser extent in 
Malaysia in the early 1990’s. It was not above 3-5% in the other Asian economies. In 
LAC this had been traditionally around 1% until 1993 then it rose to reach a peak of 5% 
in 1999 in the wake of sizeable acquisitions of privatized assets. In the early 2000’s it 
was 3%. The share of manufactures in total exports in the Asian paradigm economies is 
above 80% in most cases. Even exceptions have rapidly increased their shares in the last 
thirty or some years: India from 52% in 1970 to 75%, natural resource-rich Thailand 
from 5% to 74% and Indonesia from 1% to 56%. For LAC this is around 48%. Research 
and development expenditures was and is relatively high – around 3% of GDP – only in 
Korea. In LAC it reaches levels near 1% only in few economies as Brazil and Chile.   
 
The role of the Chinese diaspora has been crucial to the widespread success of growth 
histories in most Asian economies. Hong Kong, Singapore and India, moreover, had the 
advantage of being part of the English-speaking world. Asian economies have used a 
panoply of industrial policy instruments.
7 Some of these are now banned by upgraded 
multilateral disciplines or made more difficult to use as global trade liberalization has 
been gaining ground. Such instruments have included subsidized credit targeting 
exporters, high protection of domestic markets and tax incentives to FDI conditional on 
export performance. An important aspect of the Asian success history has been openness 
to foreign technology in its several aspects: imports of capital goods, attraction of export-
oriented  of FDI or active technology licensing (in most success histories); active 
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technological policies concerning licensing, transfer of non-proprietary technology, 
enhancing the role of returning nationals and development of domestic research.    
  
The Korean example is of great interest because the government played such an 
important role in selecting sectors as targets for its policies. And also because Korea took 
off in terms of sustained high growth while Brazil, its often mentioned counterpart in 
Latin America, practically ceased to grow after 1980. As shown by Moreira (1995) 
industrial policies in Korea have evolved over time. In the initial post-Korean war period 
there was significant financial support by the United States and easy access to the United 
States market but growth performance was mediocre. In the 1960s the emphasis was on 
outward-oriented policies. It was also possible to use export subsidies without facing  
multilateral constraints. Policies stressed industrial conglomeration, cross-subsidization 
was allowed, subsidies were conditional on export performance, there were significant 
FDI and import restrictions. Korea used comprehensive subsidization of selected sectors. 
This included: credit subsidies, foreign exchange rate-related subsidies, fiscal subsidies, 
input subsidies and administrative preferential treatment. It was as if the productive 
sector had been segmented into two parts. One geared to the domestic market under the 
umbrella of a selective and protectionist trade regime. The other directed to exports 
benefiting from a liberal trade regime with access to input and capital goods at world 
prices. In the 1970s emphasis was on the heavy and chemical industries and a greater 
stress was placed on science and technology and investment on human capital. The 
slowing down of export expansion as pointed out by Moreira (1995) is far from 
supporting an interpretation that there was any major lack of continuity in relation to the 
1960s. There were only relatively minor adjustments to the high export and GDP growth 
cum high protection. A major trade liberalization strategy was adopted after the 
macroeconomic difficulties in the early 1980s and had been completed by the early 
1990s.   
 
By comparison Brazil failed in its attempt to cope with acceleration of inflation and a 
major balance of payments crisis in the late 1970s and faced recurrent macroeconomic 
crises between 1980 and 2002. Most of the microeconomic policies described above as   19
used in Korea have been adopted and the very active export subsidization policy in the 
1970s and 1980s did not result in the emergence of many competitive exporters. In the 
foreign-owned auto industry in fact a new subsidization wave occurred after 1995 in 
marked contrast with the Asian experience of adhering to sunset provisions to withdraw 
subsidies after take off of competitive exporters. Industrial policies in Brazil tended to 
involve more or less permanent subsidization rather than Korean-type histories of 
success. It is difficult to see this export subsidization initial episode as a history of 
success.
8 The share of Brazilian exports of manufactures in total exports rose from 3% in 
the early 1960’s to 55–60% in the early 1980’s and has been stable since then. Brazil’s 
share of world exports in the period increased only from 0.67% to 0.89%, partly 
reflecting the weight of resource-based exports but also much less success in permanently 
stimulating exports. Other important contrasts between Brazil and Korea include 
knowledge-related variables such as labor force education and research and development 
expenditures. The permanent results in terms of growth were very disappointing after 
1980 and Brazil has been unable to find again the way to steady high growth as it was 
able to do between the early 1940s and 1980. GDP per capita grew on average only 0.5% 
yearly in the last quarter of century.
9    
  
The Chinese success history has been based on different institutional and political 
features even if many of the industrial policies are similar to those adopted in other 
economies.
10 The economy is segmented in two sectors. One is an export processing 
sector built on the experience of special export processing zones, geared to foreign 
markets and where FDI answers for 55% of investment. Its share in exports rose to 60% 
of the total in 2003 in contrast to a mere 20% of the mid-1980s. The other is the domestic 
export sector which had not access to world input prices and was heavily protected. Only 
in the 2000s average unweighted tariffs reached 12% and non-tariff barriers are being 
phased out. The economy has been able to accommodate a massive transfer of manpower 
from the more traditional sectors to the more dynamic export processing sector in an 
                                                       
8 Rodrik (1995) notwithstanding. 
9 See Abreu (2004) for a survey of Brazil’s policies before 1987 and Abreu (2004) for liberalizing policies 
after 1987. 
10 This based in IDB (2004).   20
upgraded version of similar movements in the past which are also at the root of 
acceleration in rates of growth.   
 
The policy package is familiar. “Strategic” sectors as software, integrated circuits and 
autos were targeted. A relatively prudent macroeconomic policy was implemented with a 
very low tax burden. Aggressive vertical industrial policies were based on familiar 
instruments such as cheap credits, tax breaks, export performance and local-content 
requirements. In line with the experience of other Asian economies policies are becoming 
increasingly horizontal as international constraints become binding. It may well be that 
China will have to face in the future problems raised by the accumulation of bad credits 
by its vulnerable state-owned banks and by the lack of a comprehensive and credible 
social security system but these problems are unlikely to affect the process of fast 





The improvement in India’s growth performance since the early 1980’s has  perplexed 
most analysts. GDP-PPP per capita growth rates have only been exceed by those of China 
and very few of the other Asian economies, especially South Korea and Taiwan (see 
Table 3). Rakshit (2004) has shown that there has been no spectacular increase in fixed 
capital formation  between the 1970s and the 1980s and 1990s: from 18.3% of GDP to 
22–23%. But there was a significant fall in the incremental capital output ratio from 
around 6 in the 1970’s to the 3.6–4.4 range in the 1990’s and afterwards.   
 
In fact, factor productivity contribution to growth in India in 1980-1999 is higher than in 
most of the rest of Asia. To which policies was this due? Rodrik and Subramanian (2004) 
have tried to answer this question. They discard often advanced explanations such as 
favorable external environment, increased demand, external liberalization, the green 
revolution, internal liberalization and public investment. They suggest that in the early 
1980s there was an “attitudinal change” towards the private sector by the national 
government. This was reflected in better growth performance of states allied with the   21
national government. In the states where the weight of formal manufacturing was greater, 
growth rates were higher. Growth occurred where previous investment had been made. 
Reforms in the 1980s were pro business rather than pro market “in the important sense 
that they served to boost the profits of existing firms without threatening them with real 
competition because external barriers remained largely in place.” Pro market reforms 
were adopted in the 1990s in response to the 1991 balance of payments.  
 
There is also not much to be learned from the Indian experience in the 1990s in terms of 
specific industrial policies. The pro market reforms promoted by Manmohan Singh after 
1991 seem rather mild by Latin American standards. The steadiness of Indian 
macroeconomic policies on the other hand is in contrast with the experience of many 
LAC economies. The outstanding sectoral example of success in recent Indian experience 
are the information technology-related industries and services. India has as main 
advantages a low-cost English-speaking labor force and a diaspora of IT skilled labor 
which is important to assure the flow of up to date technologies and can be attracted by 
domestic firms, especially when developed economies are facing recession. The IT sector 
as a whole in India (that is including hardware and software manufacturing and services) 
corresponded in 2000-2001 to rather less than 3% of GDP. With reasonable assumptions 
about future growth it will reach the United States level of 8% of GDP in 2006-2007.  IT-
related exports have expanded dramatically and since 1998-1999 have been more 
important than domestic sales. There is much controversy in India about the impact of the 
fast growth IT sector on the rest of the economy with some advantage for those arguing 
that spillovers on the rest of the economy would comfortably outweigh its unfavorable 
consequences such as, for instance, job losses in the banking sector. 
11    
 
Industrial policies in Asia have had the advantage of being implemented relatively early. 
Given the stricter present multilateral rules it is difficult to consider such success histories 
as a credible basis for extraction of lessons by Latin America. But somehow many Asian 
economies have controlled not only the “technology” of making “old fashioned” subsidy-
based growth sustainable. They have also been successful in implementing performance-
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based sunset clauses which have been important to foster adjustment in further stages of 
their growth model.  
 
Spain and Portugal 
 
The two Iberian economies have had an outstanding growth record, especially in the 25 
years after the end of the Second World War, but also since 1970. This was partly related 
to the high level of investment in both economies. By the late 1970s gross fixed capital 
formation was in both cases near 30% of GDP. Recently it fell only modestly: in Portugal 
is still 27–28% and in Spain 25%. Both Spain and Portugal of course profited from the 
opportunities opened by an integrated Europe. This preceded their formal admission to 
the European Community in the 1980s as free trade agreements had been signed with the 
EEC and EFTA in the 1960s and 1970s.  By 1960 they were rather closed economies: 
Spain’s export to GDP ratio was only 8% compared to 15% in Portugal (and a 12% world 
average). Spain started to abandon its rather autarkic model in the late 1950s when 
negotiating entry into the OECD by cutting import tariffs which by 1980 were down to 
6–8%. In the early 2000s the export-GDP ratio had risen in both cases to about 30%. In 
fact since 1960 Spain’s export performance was similar to that of Ireland as its share of 
the world market increased from 0.63% to 2.28%. But, since the evolution of Spain’s 
share was monotonic, if the mid-1970s are selected as origin the Irish export performance 
was much better since then as Ireland lost export market share until the mid-1970s. 
 
There was also Iberian convergence in relation to most of the rest of Europe in terms of 
composition of exports as the share of manufactures in total exports increased to 78% in 
Spain and 87% in Portugal. Portugal paid the price of being an important exporter of 
textiles and apparel back in the 1960s so its world export market share increased more 
modestly from 0.29% in 1960 to 0.55%  in 1990. This fell to 0.45% in the early 2000s as 
exports stagnated. 
 
Iberian industrial policies in the past have relied on rather discretionary package of tax 
and non-tax incentives. In Spain incentives have included investment in certain  regions,   23
in “special interest industries”(land cession, investment grants and preferential access to 
official credit) and in restructuring of existing industries. A complex system of tax credits 
and exemptions affected regional and sectoral investments covering fixed assets, 
advertising, marketing and R&D. It generally involved a tax credit of 10% capped to 20-
30% of taxes due. Investment incentives in pre-1980 Portugal were also extremely 
discretionary. Investment subsidies and investment grants were distributed following a 
complex system of points based on criteria that included domestic content, employment 
generation, import substitution targets, sector and region affected. Export subsidies in the 
form of reimbursement of paid domestic taxes were extensively used in both economies 
in past but have been discontinued. 
12 
  
The contrast between Spain and Portugal and the other similarly successful economies in 
Northern Europe like Ireland and Finland focuses on the role played by technology. In 
Ireland, at least since the late 1980s, the share of high-technology exports in total exports 
has fluctuated between 40–50% while in the Iberian economies it never exceeded 8% and 
in Finland, the intermediate case, it has been steadily growing from levels similar to those 
in Spain and Portugal in the late 1980s to typically 25% in recent years.  The role of FDI 
has been also been much more important in Ireland than in the Iberian economies where 
only recently the FDI-GDP ratio has reached figures beyond 5% in peak years contrasted 
to figures in Ireland above 9% in all years since 1998 and in some years above 20%. 
Finland is more akin to Spain and Portugal in spite of spikes approaching 10% in a 
couple of recent years. The good Finnish growth performance in spite of the relatively 
low FDI-GDP ratio and the low share of high-technology exports seems to be related to 
the level of R&D expenditures to GDP which is much higher than in the three other 
economies. Data on researchers and technicians engaged in R&D activities per million of 
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Ireland 
 
Recent analyses have stressed the importance of Ireland as a success growth history 
based on the sharp increase in the country’s share in world total exports and in the recent 
spectacular increase in GDP per capita.
13 A good sustained post-Second World War 
performance, especially after 1960 when GDP-PPP per capita increased more than 3% 
yearly, has culminated in the average yearly rate of more than 6% after 1990. There are 
some features of the Irish ‘miracle’, however, that make it rather peculiar and perhaps 
difficult to replicate. Ireland was already a rather open economy in 1960 with an export to 
GDP ratio of 30% compared to, for instance, 8% for Spain. Two thirds of total exports 
were food exports in the early 1960s compared to 90% of manufactured exports today. 
The British economy absorbed 75% of total Irish exports in 1960 compared to 18% in 
2003. The whole European Union including Britain buys today 61% of Irish exports. 
Gross fixed capital formation fell from nearly 30% of GDP in the 1980s to the 23-24% 
range in the early 2000s. 
 
There are many specificities in the Irish case. The Anglo-Irish Free Trade Agreement of 
1965 and accession to the European Community in 1973 played an important role in 
opening markets for Ireland. European Union support rose to almost 6% of the Irish GDP 
in 1979, remained above 3.5% until 1997 and then started to fall. In 2003 Ireland still 
received almost 400 Euros per head of population from Brussels. There is a significant 
Irish diaspora in the United Kingdom and in the United States. Ireland was also the only 
English-speaking low-income economy to become a member of the European Union. It is 
not easy to find, say, a Central American or Caribbean small economy which could 
occupy a similar position in relation to the United States. The Irish economy is small: 
with a population of about 4 million, in spite of its excellent recent growth performance 
total GDP-PPP is still about 20% below that of, say, of Portugal.   
 
In the background of the Irish miracle is the great success of macroeconomic policy. The 
often quoted evidence is the drastic fall in debt-GDP ratio from heights beyond 112% in 
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the early 1980s to a bit above 90% in 1990-1994, then monotonically to 32% in 2003 as 
the debt level remained stable and GDP growth was very significant.
14 A succession of 
wage pacts promoted a profound reform in the Irish labor market. The most significant 
initiative in the early period was a three-year national wage pact, the Programme for 
National Recovery. Supported by employers, trade unions, and the government, the pact 
limited annual wage increases to 2.5% between 1988 and 1990. As part of the pact, the 
government agreed to offset the limits on wages by cutting income taxes and increasing 
spending for welfare, health, and housing services. Unemployment benefits were 
tightened. The Irish government increased spending on programs designed to mobilize 
labor supply, improve job skills, and increase the efficiency of labor markets to reach 
1.8% of GDP. Unemployment fell from more than 17% to around 4%. The success of this 
initial pact led to five subsequent pacts.
15 Success was also helped by a luckily timed 
educational reform which increased the supply of skilled labor. 
 
Industrial policies in Ireland have evolved over time towards instruments compatible with 
international rules. Before entry in the European Community there were export-related 
exemptions from income tax. They were substituted by a 10% (now 12.5%) corporate 
income tax on manufacturing compared to a mid-30%s corporate standard rate. In the late 
1990s tax relief through differential corporate taxes and accelerated depreciation was 
equivalent to 4.3% of GDP. Industrial policies were rather comprehensive and also 
included active policies to support domestically-owned firms, trade intelligence support, 
training grants, interest subsidies, loan guarantees, R&D grants and fixed assets grants. 
IDA, the Industrial Development Authority, has traditionally used fixed assets grants as 
an instrument of industrial policy. In the early 1980s this could reach 45%–60% of 
eligible costs and was capped. Variables taken into account in the decision-making 
process include employment generation, skill content, value added, potential growth, 
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linkages, location and export potential.
16 Ireland has been extremely successful in 





Finland, while a relatively latecomer in the process of European integration, having 
joined in 1995, had free access to the European Union market of industrial products since 
1977 as a member of EFTA. It also had some benefits with its economic links with the 
Soviet Union before 1990 as these provided scale to selected branches of Finnish 
industry.
17 But Finland has marginally lost world market share since 1960: 0.63% of 
world exports in 2002 compared to 0.7% in 1960. It almost doubled its export to GDP 
ratio – from 20% to 38% – but this was below the growth of the world aggregate ratio 
which rose from 12% to 24%. The size of the Finnish economy is similar to that of 
Ireland.  
 
Finland is near the top of the OECD list with R&D expenditures of 3.5% as a share of  
GDP and at the top of the list in the 2004-2005 global competitiveness evaluation 
undertaken by the World Economic Forum. Successful industrial policies have played a 
key role in the good growth performance of the Finnish industry. Finland has used and 
uses industrial policies but the Nordic countries have always resisted to significant state 
intervention through industrial policies in spite of important  state ownership in the past.
18 
In late 1980’s extant incentives were rather conventional. Regional incentives based in 
accelerated depreciation and investment subsidies based in additional depreciation 
allowances as well as investment grants and start-up subsidies have been used. Tax 
legislation encouraged the building up of tax-exempt investment reserves which could 
also be used for R&D, training, promotion of exports and prevention of pollution. 
                                                       
16 It is important to note that such capital assets grants while not prohibited in limine by the WTO are 
actionable according to the agreement on subsidies. But there may a loophole for SMEs in the grey area 
surrounding interpretation of footnote 2 of article 2 of the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures. 
17 See Kokko and Haavisto (1990). 
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Allowances related to R&D have been in existence. They cover a declining share of costs 
as these increase and are capped for each enterprise. Incentives targeted to ship owners 
and shipbuilding have also been used. 
19 
 
An important role has been played by since the early 1980’s by the National Technology 
Agency (Tekes). Tekes is the main public funding organization for research and 
development in Finland. It funds industrial projects as well as projects in research 
institutes, and especially promotes innovative, risk-intensive projects.  It offers industrial 
grants (15 to 50 % of eligible costs) and loans (35 to 60 %) which can be combined. 
Research grants directed to the research work done at research institutes and universities 
can range from 50 to 100 % of eligible costs. Projects are usually conducted in 
cooperation with companies.  Selective project funding is the basis of Tekes operations. 
Funding and expert services are channeled to technological R&D projects. Tekes assists 
companies in their search for ideas, the finalization of business plans, and their quest to 
conduct meaningful and valuable research.
20 It works in collaboration with several 
partners within the Finnish innovation environment. For basic research, the main agency 
of implementation is the Academy of Finland. At regional level, technology policy is 
implemented by Employment and Economic Development Centers distributed over the 
country. The main aim of these centers is to keep close to the entrepreneurs and 
innovative talent across Finland. The list offices abroad is suggestive: Beijing, Shanghai, 
Brussels, San José (California), and Tokyo.   
 
Latin America: Chile and Costa Rica   
 
In Latin America there has been less success in comparison with Asian and European 
success histories both in sustaining growth with old formulae and in the evolution to a 
less interventionist growth model There are few exceptions such as Chile and a few 
economies in Central America and the Caribbean. There are two strong candidates to 
qualify as  paradigms: Chile and Costa Rica. Chile is the only economy with a recent 
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history of high growth in which manufactured exports are a small share of total exports. 
Success has been concentrated in the 1990s while for most other experiences which may 
serve as example the high growth experience has been sustained during a longer period. 
In both cases gross fixed capital formation has remained not much above 20% in contrast 
with the Asian experience. In Chile it peaked at 23-26% in 1992-98 and in Costa Rica it 
has remained in the 18-20% range.  
 
Chile’s share of world exports fell significantly in the long-term: it was 0.36% in 1960 
and continued to fall to reach 0.21% in 1984. But since then it has recovered a little of the 
lost ground reaching 0.29% of world exports. To do so Chile diversified its exports 
significantly with the share in total exports of food products and manufactures increasing 
to 26% and 18%, respectively, compared to only 5% and 4% thirty years ago. The share 
of high technology exports in manufactured exports remains low although there is much 
technological advance behind the increased competitiveness of its food exports. Chile has 
become the world's second-largest producer of farmed salmon after Norway with a world 
market share of 20%, and also a significant exporter of fruits and wine.  As a result of  
success of its macroeconomic and microeconomic policies Chile has guaranteed 
attractive conditions of operation for FDI. Between 1994 and 2001 FDI inflows exceeded 
5% of GDP,  peaking at 12% in 1999. 
  
Chile has important programs of regional and R&D incentives. ProChile, an agency 
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, operates various program aimed at broadening 
Chile's export base and increasing the competitiveness of exports mainly through co-
financing.
 The National Fund for Technological and Productive Development, a subsidiary 
of CORFO, finances research and development projects proposed and implemented by 
private enterprises with the objective of promoting technological innovation and transfer.   
Fundación Chile, a private institution with governmental representation that promotes the 
development of  firms and clusters, has played a major role in stimulating the building up 
of capacity in the salmon industry, the development of preserved meat and forestry 
technologies,  the improvement of fruit quality control and the introduction in Chile of 
new fruit varieties. R&D expenditures as a share of GDP are still comparatively low at   29
around 1% and the number of R&D researchers per million inhabitants only something 
like 20% of that of Portugal.    
 
Chile adopted in the past a system of deferred payment of customs duties and tax benefits 
with a view to promoting technological innovation and stimulating the purchase of capital 
goods. These have been phased out since 1998. In January 1996, Chile notified to the 
WTO the application of trade-related investment measures in the automotive sector.
 This 
has also been discontinued. Subsidies to forestry in the past have included investment 
grants (up to 75% of costs) and tax exemptions. 
 
Costa Rica good recent growth performance has relied on its success in expanding high 
technology exports mainly, but not exclusively related to Intel's investment in 1997 of 
US$300 million for the construction of processor assembly and testing plants.  In 1999, 
Intel's exports accounted for 38 per cent of total exports. This has stimulated additional 
foreign investment by Intel’s suppliers. The share of high-technology exports in total 
manufactured exports which was only 6% in 1994 peaked at 53% in 1999. But the 
electronic components industry still has few links with local businesses.  Costa Rica’s 
share of world exports had shown a downward trend between 1960 and 1990 (from 
0.07% to 0.05%). With the new export-oriented industrial policy this share doubled in the 
1990s to reach a peak 0.1% in the early 2000s. These spectacular results were, of course, 




Costa Rica operated promotion programs which are applied in almost every sector. These  
included subsidized credit to SMEs and tax incentives for specific sectors. Some of the 
incentives were due to stop in 2003 in accordance with WTO commitments. The only 
trade-related investment incentive notified to the WTO was a domestic content 
requirement for subscribers to an export contract as an essential condition for receiving a 
tax credit certificate. This ceased to be applied in 1999.   
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There are many other tax privileges and incentives covering new investments in free 
zones including exemptions from import duties on inputs and capital goods and from 
sales and consumption tax; cooperatives; costs related to human and technical resources 
in favor of SMEs; additional concessions under the free zone regime for enterprises that 
set up in relatively underdeveloped areas. Research development expenditures in Costa 
Rica amount to roughly 0.3 per cent of GDP. The government co-finances projects but up 
to rather modest amounts and since 2000 may fund 100% of the costs of research, 
development and technological management by trade associations and Costa Rican 
SMEs. The development of Sectoral Business Committees (Comités Empresariales 
Sectoriales) consisting of businessmen (usually grouped together in a chamber or 
association) and government officials has been promoted since 1995. 
 
4. Limits of the possible 
  
Multilateral disciplines on industrial policies have been tightened in the Uruguay Round 
of trade negotiations. This affected the degrees of freedom enjoyed by many developing 
economies in implementing policies based on subsidies and preferential treatment of 
foreign direct investment.  The successful growth history of many of the most often 
quoted paradigms relied on policies which became illegal under new multilateral 
disciplines.  
 
One of the more significant results of the Uruguay Round of trade negotiations was the 
new set of rules on subsidies embodied in the Agreement on Subsidies and 
Countervailing Measures. Subsidies were classified as prohibited, actionable and non-
actionable. Prohibited subsidies are those contingent on export performance or upon the 
use of domestic over imported goods. Actionable subsidies for industrial goods include 
those causing injury to the domestic industry, nullification or impairment  of benefits 
accruing to other members under GATT 1994, and serious prejudice to the interests of 
other members. Non-actionable subsidies are those which are not specific and those 
which are specific but related to research activities, assistance to disadvantaged regions   31
and assistance to promote adaptation of existing facilities to new environmental 
requirements. 
 
Subsidies to research activities by firms or conducted by higher education or research 
establishments on a contract basis with firms if assistance covers not more than 75% of 
the costs of industrial
22 research or 50% of pre-competitive development activities. The 
nature of this assistance is detailed in the agreement (Article 8.1a).
23 Assistance to 
disadvantaged regions must be non-specific within eligible regions whose GDP per capita 
must not be above 85% of the national average (and the unemployment rate at least 110% 
of the national average). Environment-related assistance should be non-recurring and 
limited to 20% of the cost of the adaptation. There are complex exceptions to the 
prohibition of subsidies granting special and differentiated treatment to developing 
country members. But most developing economies have been graduated after 2002 as 
sunset provisions affected transitional S&D. 
  
The Uruguay Round also established disciplines limiting domestic support measures and 
export subsidies related to agricultural products. But these were subjected to a “peace 
clause” to be applied for ten years. Since agricultural subsidization is a major feature of 
policies in developed economies and rather less significant in developing economies it is 
not likely – in contrast with industrial products – that the latter would be targeted by 
countervailing measures in the markets of developed economies. 
24     
 
The Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures (TRIMs) which resulted from the 
Uruguay Round stipulated that developing economies should discontinue any TRIM 
which violated GATT 1994 inconsistent with national treatment and with the obligation 
to eliminate quantitative restrictions.
25 This mainly affected schemes to attract foreign 
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Agriculture. See WTO (1995).  
23 See WTO (1995), pp. 264-314. 
24 See WTO (1995), pp. 39-68. 
25 See WTO (1995), pp. 163-7. Least developed economies were given seven years to adjust.   32
direct investment offering preferential treatment conditional on future export 
performance. 
 
5. Institution building, macroeconomics and industrial policies 
 
The discussion on the overhaul of industrial policies frequently takes place without taking 
into account constraints imposed by the pace of implementation of other reforms. 
Especially relevant are reforms related to institution-building and  macroeconomic 
policies. Successful industrial policies depend on effective provision of public services 
including the effectiveness of government intervention in the provision of infrastructure. 
The establishment of an effective regulatory framework is especially important to assure 
the stable provision of such services without exploitation of market power. In most 
developing  economies this task is made even more complex by macroeconomic 
instability and consequent fluctuations in the exchange rate. As much of their   
infrastructure is foreign-owned or foreign funded there are thorny problems raised by 
their  objective of maximizing profits in foreign currency. 
  
Macroeconomic management may also impose important constraints on industrial 
policies. In several LAC economies the 1980s were a period of severe financial crisis of 
the public sector with a sharp fall in public savings which in certain cases became 
negative. This affected overall levels of savings and of fixed capital formation. In Brazil, 
for instance, gross fixed capital formation as a share of GDP fell from peaks above 23% 
in the 1970s to under 17% in 1984–85. Even this low level of investment overestimated 
the effective increase in productive capacity. This was partly explained by increased 
investment costs as discussed below and also with the reversal of expectations related to 
the beginning of an extremely severe recession. As negative growth affected government 
revenues planned expenditures had to be cut. The government adjusted its planned 
expenditures by cutting investment over the board, that is affecting all projects in the 
government portfolio, rather than trying to minimize the damage by mothballing those 
projects with a lower rate of return and finishing those with higher rates of return. The   33
result, given the importance of public investment, was to delay the impact of aggregate 
investment on increased productive capacity.   
  
Successful stabilization programs in many economies in LAC have been maintained only 
with the adoption of rather strict fiscal disciplines often in the context of IMF programs.  
This resulted in severe cuts in public expenditure and significant constraints on expanded 
expenditures or tax expenditures related to industrial policies. Indeed, in some 
economies, as in Brazil, success in reducing inflation has depended on maintaining a 
regime of real interest rates around 10% yearly. Long-term success of the stabilization 
policy depends on the ability to reduce debt-GDP ratios and real rates of interest. The 
slower is this process, which often depends on a combination of increased tax burden and 
expenditure cuts, the stronger the vested interests in maintaining alternative sources of 
long-term government finance at lower, subsidized interest rates. This is directed to run 
of the mill investment projects without any particular concern for the correction of 
market failures. During this hopefully transitional period there tends to exist a crowding 
out, everything else constant, of  resources required to finance industrial policies. 
 
Relatively bigger economies with a relevant domestic production of capital goods face 
problems concerning the cost of investment which do not arise in smaller economies. If 
most capital goods are imported, the cost of creating new productive capacity depends on 
the cost of imports of capital goods. But in economies where import substitution fostered 
the creation of a relevant capital goods sector any effort to liberalize trade policies is 
likely to meet with the resistance of domestic producers of such goods trying to protect 
their market share. A not uncommon result is that tariffs on capital goods are higher than 
average tariffs. Cost of investment will be higher in these economies than in economies 
with no tariffs on capital goods. Combined with the consequences of rising inflation on 
the price of capital goods and rising costs of construction – as part of increased demand 
for protection against inflation – this may lead to a severe weakening of the ability to 
transform savings into investment and real productive capacity. It makes more severe the   34




Many arguments on the links between capital goods and growth are also relevant for the 
links between human capital and growth. Quality and costs of production of human 
capital are relevant to explain growth.  The composition of human capital (for instance, 
the share of science and technology students in tertiary education) may be important to 
qualify data on average years of schooling. Some countries may be more efficient than  
others in generating human capital much in the same way as this happens in the case of 
physical capital. 
 
6. Policy alternatives  
 
Taxonomies of industrial policies have tended to stress whether their application is 
universal or selective – horizontal or vertical in the trade jargon. Horizontal policies have 
been typically based on tax rebates for expenditures related to technological development 
or direct support of research and development activities following the lines of the waivers 
contained in the WTO rules on non-actionable subsidies.
27 The advantage of horizontal 
policies of course is that the dangers involved in discrimination of some economic agents 
to the detriment of others are avoided. One does not have to try to pick winners, a rather 
tricky activity and one in which specific national records of success vary quite 
substantially. Especially so in Latin America.  
 
Even economists not well known for their orthodoxy – Paul Krugman comes to mind 
prominently – have after all decided to avoid policy prescription based on selective 
measures given the difficulties of gathering enough information to instruct the relevant 
decision-making processes. The bottom line is that while it is recognized that selective 
policies are very effective when market failure acts as a powerful wedge between social 
                                                       
26 See Abreu (2004) pp. 17-19 for a more detailed discussion of the case of Brazil.   
27 Subsidized credit offered by state-owned banks as the Brazilian BNDES may be argued by some as a 
horizontal policy as it is in principle open to (almost) all sectors. But there is a grey area in the criteria   35
and private costs and benefits it is unlikely that policy-makers will be able to have access 
to the information required to select their targets wisely. 
 
To restrict industrial policy to horizontal policies, however, waives the use of selective 
policies to redress market failures which may be extremely significant. There has been 
recently a revival of interest in such selective policies.
28 Rodríguez-Clare (2004) has 
stressed the importance of policies targeted at clusters as clusters reflect industry-specific 
regional externalities. Knowledge spillovers are stronger across firms in similar and 
related industries. Clusters may include not only targeted industries, their suppliers 
upstream and clients downstream sectors, but also specialized infrastructure (for instance 
certification institutions), technical training facilities, providers of scientific and 
technological services, publicly funded research institutions, tertiary education, targeted 
scholarship programs abroad and identification and consolidation of presence in foreign 
markets as information spillovers justify government intervention.     
 
It has been proposed that industrial policies should focus on the strengthening of sector 
organizations through subsidization of their process of “self discovery” of new product 
lines and existing technologies abroad.
29 After economic agents have been stimulated to 
broaden their knowledge about alternative markets, technologies and methods of 
production conditions are mature to design clustering strategies and, finally, implement 
the selected strategy. Proposed instruments include production-related grants benefiting 
preferably young or new small and medium firms, something which has been 
successfully used in many successful growth experiences, the most recent example being 
Ireland. 
 
The crucial question of course is which clusters to choose. It has been proposed that it 
would be reasonable to choose sectors in which the country has comparative advantage or 
                                                                                                                                                               
adopted by the bank to ration borrowers and  a big gap between total investment and investment financed 
by the bank. 
28 See for instance Rodrik (200$) and Rodríguez-Clare (2004b). But spillovers for the latter are of the same 
magnitude in all sectors. 
29 See Rodríguez-Clare (2004b).   36
good export performance.
30 But surely this is a criterion which introduces a bias against 
the discovery of new opportunities. It is also unclear at which level of aggregation in the 
classification of activities should be the assessment of export performance or comparative 
advantage. Some of these criteria are “distorted” by former policies adopted before the 
new proposed policies were introduced. In large economies the scope for the choice of 
clusters will tend to be wider and the concentration of resources in a single cluster would 
tend to be more difficult due to opposing regional/sectoral lobbies. There is perhaps an 
argument for a strategy of multiple clusters reflecting different industry-specific regional 
externalities and consequently affecting different sectors. Perhaps it could be somewhat 
improved by establishing size-related rationing criteria for firms – and perhaps also for 
sectors – but it unclear how this could be reconciled with the minimization of 
implementation costs. It is well known that the costs of implementing industrial policies 
rocket as the average size of affected firms decrease.   
 
Policies designed to cope with difficulties faced by entrepreneurs in what has been 
termed their “self discovery” are controversial.
31 “Self discovery” policies must be 
broadly based by their very nature. If not truly horizontal at least they should affect many  
sectors. There is in fact no very good reason to limit subsidies of “self discovery” to firms 
and not extend them to individuals. There is also no assurance that “self discovery” 
would only enhance positive aspects of entrepreneurship. It would certainly raise the 
rent-seeking capability of the sectors affected and require better institutions and decision-
making to cope with this. 
 
Rodrik’s  (2004) belief that the “stunning success that Fundación Chile – a public agency 
–  achieved with salmon can pay for many subsequent mistakes” in the process of project 
selection is conditional on picking up a case of hitting the jackpot in an early decision. 
Surely other national experiences come to mind as less likely to provide grounds for such 
optimism on the quality of decision-making. In many cases difficulties entailed by 
                                                       
30 Rodríguez-Clare (2004b). This is based on Rodríguez-Clare (2004a).  But some of the assumptions 
required for modelling are very restrictive such as those on economies of scale and dynamic internal 
economies.  
31 See Rodrik (2004).   37
subsidization of investment in non-traditional industries are unlikely to be solved by any 
combination of performance requirements, close monitoring of use of resources or 
subsidy sunset clauses.
32 The required “ability to cut losses once mistakes are 
recognized” sits badly with the historical evidence in most LAC economies which are 
very incompetent in the business of subsidy sunset clauses. In any case the often quoted 
example of the Chilean salmon is a counterexample of a strategy that would center on 
clusters in sectors or products for which it is possible to show that a country had 
comparative advantage in the past.   
 
There has been strong and solid criticism of many, mainly horizontal policies focused on 
attraction of foreign direct investment, increasing exports or enhancing the role of SMEs 
as policies complementary to orthodox macroeconomic programs.
33 Somewhat less 
convincing are the criticisms of innovation policies based on general tax expenditures 
related to science and technology. This criticism is based on the argument that selective 
measures would be more effective. But general tax expenditure systems can be improved. 
If, for instance, university research demanded by a group of firms to university or 
autonomous research centers is preferable to intra-firm research this can be at least partly 
accommodated by a more sophisticated tax expenditure system offering diversified tax 
rebates. Once again the problem with a system based totally on selectivity is the lack of 
confidence that the relevant targets would be reached. The suggestion that tax 
expenditures should be discontinued seems also to be based on the questionable 
assumption that funds would thus be released in favor of programs which rely on 
selective policies. In real life it is to be doubted whether overall budget discussions 
including sectoral tax expenditures and tax expenditures are on a net basis; it may be 
difficult to assure that all R&D-related tax expenditure released by its abolition is used to 
increase expenditures in R&D vertical policies.    
 
There are complications in making compatible centralized and decentralized policies. In 
most economies industrial policies are intertwined with regional policies. Moreover the 
                                                       
32 Export performance requirements related to subsidies are in any case prohibited by the WTO. 
33 Rodríguez (2004b), sections I and III, quoting Audretsch and Feldman (2003).   38
WTO most important waivers concerning non-actionable subsidies refer to science & 
technology and regional development. Science & technology tax expenditures often refer 
to central government taxation while regional development tax expenditures are 
frequently also distributed by other levels of government. FDI attraction justifies lower 
taxes or, more generally, reduced costs. But this is mainly because of technological 
externalities, an  argument not often heard among those seeking to attract FDI. The 
traditional problem here is a run to the bottom as different states and municipalities 
compete to attract new investments.
34  
 
7. Policy recommendations  
 
First and foremost it is important to recognize that macroeconomic stability must be 
achieved and that this in general has preceded the histories of growth success propped by 
specific industrial policies. There is no case of an economy with chronic significant 
stabilization problems with a good growth performance.  It may be possible of course to 
design and implement new industrial policies while stabilization policies still occupy a 
central role in the economic agenda. But as a rule fiscal constraints would significantly 
restrict the scope of industrial policies which require significant expenditures or entail 
reduction in revenues. 
 
Only in rare cases there was significant and sustained growth without a substantial 
improvement of the previous record of investment and capacity of saving. This 
automatically raises issues related to the cost of investment which affects the costs of 
both capital goods and of construction. And also their quality. “Microeconomic” policies 
must target cost and quality to ensure that investment is cost-effective, that is, that 
addition to productive capacity is maximized given an investment ratio. This is no simple 
task, especially in the bigger economies where one would expect that it exists a 
significant domestic capacity to produce capital goods with political clout to fight trade 
liberalization. The other closely related issue is also a grey area between macro- and 
                                                       
34 See Barreix and Villela (2003), section V, for a discussion of these problems in Mercosur. See also 
Fernández-Arias, Houseman and Stein (2001).    39
micro-policies. The lower is the variance in an economy’s growth performance the lower 
the probability that investment plans will be affected by the economic cycle. Fluctuations 
in the rate of growth in the past have badly affected government savings and the level of 
public expenditure as they generate revenue shortfalls. Projected rates of return are 
adversely affected as the conclusion of the intended plants or of infrastructure is delayed. 
This may also affect private investment.  
 
In the realm of industrial policies a good starting point is the recognition of that 
international constraints prevent in principle the use of many instruments which have 
been effective in past successful country experiences: preferential access to foreign 
exchange cover, subsidized credit, national content rules, export performance criteria, 
among others. This naturally brings the focus to policies which target market failures that 
are covered by WTO rules on non-actionable subsidies related to science & technology, 
at least some aspects of regional disparities and environment-related projects. On the 
other hand, since horizontal policies are non-specific in the WTO sense, there is a strong 
argument for their defense as there are not subsidies which can be targeted by dissatisfied 
trade partners. 
 
There are other arguments that suggest that horizontal policies should not be totally 
discontinued in favor of horizontal industrial policies. Horizontal policies may lack focus 
and give room for merely disguising expenditures which are unrelated to science &   
technology development. But they avoid the difficulties related to specificity that 
characterize vertical policies even when they are targeted to address market failures.   
There is no simply golden rule to define the optimal balance between general and specific 
policies given these inherent limitations. In most economies there is certainly scope for a 
finer tuning of tax expenditures related to science and technology as well as for a much 
better system of monitoring of the quality of expenditures which qualify for tax 
expenditures. Information on how tax expenditures are distributed may be a useful tool to 
signal which sectors are crucial targets for vertical policies. 
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Between vertical policies targeting firms and horizontal policies there is scope for many 
policies at the intermediate level of aggregation which affect firms in specific sectors or 
regions. In this connection the concern with clusters is particularly relevant. One may 
think of long list of projects which generate powerful positive externalities and may make 
particular sense in the context of a cluster: specialized infrastructure, regulation-related 
issues with a sectoral focus, government-sponsored research in specialized research 
institutions, applied research commissioned by the private sector undertaken by 
universities, technical education and university training both domestically and abroad.  
 
There is much to be said in favor of a coordination of the several layers of intervention 
prompted by market failures mentioned above, something which does not happen in 
many economies. This sectorially-based coordination process may include some private 
sector representation, but not in a dominant position. Brazil experimented in the 1950s 
with a rather successful administrative format during the implementation of the 1956-
1961  Plano de Metas [Targets Plan]. As the government faced an obsolete and 
obstructive civil service, an ad hoc network of sectoral executive groups was created in 
an effort to circumvent the traditional decision-making process. This is in sharp contrast 
with the much less successful recent experience with the câmaras setoriais [sectorial 
chambers] of the 1980s and 1990s where representatives of firms and labor unions tended 
to hijack such sectorially organized gatherings purporting to represent all affected sectors. 
The end result took the form of policy packages that favored specific sectors without 
taking account overall public interest.  
  
Opportunities created by WTO rules that allow regional subsidies should be used perhaps 
through a combination of science and technology and regional tax expenditures and 
vertical industrial policies. This is likely to be relatively more relevant in the larger 
economies as clustering is likely to be meaningful for a diversity of regions. It is also 
more likely that in the larger economies the interplay of the economics of agglomeration 
and diseconomies of congestion will induce the formation of new clusters. 
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In spite of all well known difficulties involved in gathering the required information 
vertical policies addressed to the improvement of distortions related to market failures 
still may have an important role in a comprehensive framework of industrial policies. 
Such vertical policies have been applied in Brazil in certain periods in the past taking into 
account a rational set of criteria targeting the risk entailed by specific projects, the 
importance of net externalities created, the ability of benefited firms to appropriate the 
results of their projects and the geographical location of projects in depressed areas.  
 
It is important that this effort is undertaken by agencies with a high level of competence 
in the evaluation of technological alternatives and able to identify and mobilize state of 
the art technologies (adjusted to national conditions) on a global basis.  It is essential that 
a robust evaluation machinery is put in place with the participation of acknowledged 
specialists recruited on a worldwide basis following transparent procedures. The 
objective would be to evaluate the results of previous efforts and offer a feedback that 
contributes to improve the “aim” of policy-makers in their selection of which market 
failures to aim at in the future.  
 
Vertical policies aimed at market failures still involve picking winners. but based on  
much more defensible criteria than the traditional policies favoring of rent-seeking 
sectors with political clout and without any concern for market failure correction. It 
compares favorably with the plain subsidization which has been typical of most of Latin 
America in the past.   
  
The implementation of a meaningful package of “industrial policies” requires a political 
commitment at the highest level on the blueprint of such a set of policies. It is important 
that the government opens a comprehensive debate on industrial policies and is able to 
win political support for rational policies. But it is debatable whether industrial policy 
implementation requires either continuous involvement of politicians at the highest level 
or a previously explicitly formulated strategic national social process. 
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The implementation of a package of horizontal and vertical industrial policies may 
require an overhaul of obsolescent government institutions. The Finnish experience may 
be particularly relevant here as it may be essential to transform purely financial agencies 
into TEKES-type technological and scientific agencies able to gather meaningful market 
information and undertake effective technological brokerage that will improve access of  
national industry to state of the art technologies adapted to their specificities. It is in this 
environment that “self discovery” should ideally take place involving full mobilization of 
science and technology institutions: government departments, academies of sciences, 
research institutions, universities, certification agencies, organizations of entrepreneurs 
and firms. 
 
The success of China raises the issue of the links between growth and innovation. The  
World Bank has organized a large global data base on the knowledge economy.
35 This 
data base has been used by Chen and Dahlman (2004) for a cross-section study of the 
links between economic growth and a long list of variables. They come out with the 
conclusion that a major role in determining growth performance is played by human 
capital stock (measured by years of schooling with allowances for quality), domestic 
innovation and  technological adaptation (measured by the number of patents normalized 
by population) and information and communications technology (measured by the 
number of telephones normalized by population). The impact of domestic innovation and 
technological adaptation is particularly powerful: a 1% increase in the number of patents 
is associated with increase of 0.19% in the annual rate of economic growth.    
 
On the other hand, links between variations of an overall innovation index since 1990 – 
the Knowledge Economy Index – and the rate of growth of GDP-PPP per capita in 1990-
2001 for the sample of paradigms and of Latin American followers are rather weak. The 
KEI is composed of variables covering the Economic Incentive Regime, Innovation, 
Education, and Information Infrastructure. China is a big exception showing a hefty rise 
in the KEI coupled with its high rate of  growth of GDP-PPP per capita. But there is 
deviant behavior of economies that grow substantially without increase in the KEI 
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(Ireland) and  also of those with a big increase in the KEI and a stagnant growth 
performance (Brazil). It is reasonable to think of KEI time evolution as characterized by 
an exhaustion process as economies tend to become mature. And, in the case of Brazil, 
the suspicion is that besides possible problems with the absence of correction for quality 
in some of the measures, e.g. years of schooling,  macroeconomic imbalances dominate 
the improvement in KEI.   44
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